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CELL PHONES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN FLIGHT: CAN THE FCC AND 
FAA MAINTAIN THE BAN? 
By: Christopher Dengler 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) may lift the ban on in-flight cell 
phone use.1  If such a barrier falls, this creates an opportunity 
to increase business productivity, personal communication, and 
general freedom of expression during flights.  Many business 
hours are spent traveling for work-related activities.  The lack 
of communication with the office negatively impacts productivity; 
and no type of travel more obviously impedes business 
productivity than air travel because of the long duration and 
                                                
1 See Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Advisory: 
Using Your Wireless Phones on Airplanes, Sept. 23, 2005, 
http://ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cellonplanes.html (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2005) (stating that the potentially lifting of 
the cell phone ban during flight is being explored and is open to 
public comment); see also Peter Rojas, FCC Extends Comment Period 
on In-Flight Cellphone Ban, Engadget, Apr. 28, 2005, 
http://engadget.com/entry/1234000950041666/ (last visited Oct. 
14, 2005). 
2 
lack of connectivity with the office when in flight.2  However, 
lifting the ban is not unopposed. 
When the FCC and the FAA presented their proposal to lift 
the ban, both support3 and concern4 quickly surfaced.  Moreover, 
                                                
2 See Staffan Algers, Johanna Lindqvist Dillen, Transek 
Consultancy, Staffan Widlert & The Swedish Institute for 
Transportation and Communications Analysis, The National Swedish 
Value of Time Study 13 (1994) (stating that a survey showed that 
the productivity while traveling aboard a train was approximately 
60% of the productivity seen in the office). 
3 See Joe Sharkey, Cellphones in Flight: The Story is Data, Not 
Chatter, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2004, at C6 (“[T]here is 
overwhelming support for changing the rules to allow the use of 
wireless communications devices in the air . . . [with silent 
communication –] data, not voice . . . .”). 
4 See Sara Kehaulani Goo & Keith L. Alexander, In-Flight Calls 
Could Cause Turbulence, Opponents Say, Washington Post, Apr. 8, 
2005, at E01 (The National Consumers League sponsored a poll that 
said “63 percent of Americans don’t want the federal government 
to lift its ban on cell phones in flight.”) available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/04/08/AR2005040800564.html.  The 
Association of Flight Attendants supports maintaining the 
regulations banning cell phone use during flight based on both 
continuing technological safety concerns and passenger 
3 
                                                                                                                                            
disruptions.  The Association of Flight Attendants stated that 
they were still “concerned with the possibility of random, 
unpredictable electromagnetic interference events that could 
interfere with an aircraft’s operations.”  Comments of 
Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO, In the Matter of: 
Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to Facilitate the Use of 
Cellular Telephones and Other Wireless Devices Aboard Airborne 
Aircraft, Before the FCC, WT Docket No. 04-435 (May 26, 2005) 
(available at http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-15-
05/friend.pdf).  However, scientific research, while not yet 
conclusive, seems to lead to the conclusion that current cell 
phone technology does not interfere with airplane 
instrumentation, or current technology – such as pico cells or 
forced low-power mode for cell phones used in-flight – exists to 
virtually eliminate safety issues.  See Baskar Sridharan & Aditya 
P. Mathur, Aircraft Safety in the Presence of Portable Electronic 
Devices 2 (Purdue University, Department of Computer Science).  
The pico cells are devices that can be used on airplanes as a 
“mobile” cell phone node and they could also be used to force the 
cell phones on the aircraft into a low power mode where there 
should be no interference with either terrestrial communications 
or on board sensors.  See Access Intelligence, LLC, Lifting Ban 
on Mobile Phone Use in Flight – Do So Carefully Warn 
Commentators, Air Safety Week, June 13, 2005, 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_2005_June_13/a
4 
recent developments galvanized those opposed to lifting the ban.  
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. is considering marketing adult material 
to cell phone Internet users.5  In fact, similar material is 
already available to cell phone users in Europe and Asia.6  
                                                                                                                                            
i_n13831432.  Scientific experiments by airlines offer counter-
examples, showing that a laptop was unable to cause interference 
with the aircraft’s communication or navigation.  Id.  Beside 
potential technological safety, the Association of Flight 
Attendants cite operational disruptions in the cabin – unruly 
passengers who fail to follow flight crew instructions – as an 
additional reason to continue the ban on cell phone use in-
flight.  Comments of Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-
CIO, In the Matter of: Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to 
Facilitate the Use of Cellular Telephones and Other Wireless 
Devices Aboard Airborne Aircraft, Before the FCC, WT Docket No. 
04-435 (May 26, 2005) (available at 
http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-15-
05/friend.pdf). 
5 In early 2005, Playboy.com made digital pictures available on 
electronic handheld devices.  Jay Jay Nesheim, Playboy.com Offers 
Stunning Image Galleries for Hand-Held Digital Photo Devices Like 
the iPod Photo, Jan. 4, 2005, http://www.playboyenterprises.com/ 
(follow “News and Media” hyperlink) (last visited Nov. 27, 2005). 
6 Matt Richtel, U.S. Providers Turned off by Porn, Violence via 
Cell Phone, The San Diego Union-Tribune, Dec. 27, 2004, 
5 
Parental rights groups vocally oppose cell phone pornography 
because of its accessibility to minors.7  They have lobbied the 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041227/news_mzlb27provi
d.html; see also Cassell Bryan-Low & David Pringle, Sex Cells: 
Wireless Operators Find that Racy Cellphone Video Drives Surge in 
Broadband, Post-Gazette.com, May 12, 2005, http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/05132/503397.stm (finding that erotic content is 
available via cell phones in France, Germany, Greece, Portugal, 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia). 
7 See Cassell Bryan-Low & David Pringle, Sex Cells: Wireless 
Operators Find that Racy Cellphone Video Drives Surge in 
Broadband, Post-Gazette.com, May 12, 2005, http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/05132/503397.stm (“The Mississippi-based American 
Family Association sent an ‘action alert’ last month about 
Playboy Enterprises Inc.’s plan to offer content for cell phones 
[sic] and urged members to ask the FCC to ‘set heavy fines for 
pornographers who send their porn to our children’”); see also 
James L. Lambert, Former DOJ Prosecutor to Parents: Beware . . . 
Cell Phone Porn is on the Horizon, AgapePress, May 13, 2005, 
http://headlines.agapepress.org/archive/5/132005e.asp (stating 
that members from pro-family groups – the American Family 
Association, Morality in Media, and the Family Research Council – 
met with the FCC to discuss ways to block pornographic material 
from being accessed via cell phones); see generally Morality in 
the Media, http://www.moralityinmedia.org/ (“[A] national, not-
6 
government to promulgate regulations restricting minor’s 
accessibility to this material, including maintaining the ban on 
cell phone use during flight.8  For example, Morality in Media, 
Inc.9 sees this gateway to adult material to be especially 
problematic on an airplane because of the close quarters and the 
presence of minors.10 
                                                                                                                                            
for-profit, interfaith organization established in 1962 to combat 
obscenity and uphold decency standards in the media.”) (last 
visited Nov. 29, 2005). 
8 See Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2005); 
Child Online Protection Act (COPA), 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2005); 
Children’s Internet Protection Act, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2001). 
9 http://www.moralityinmedia.org 
10 See Access Intelligence, LLC, Lifting Ban on Mobile Phone Use 
in Flight – Do So Carefully Warn Commentators, Air Safety Week, 
June 13, 2005, 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_2005_June_13/a
i_n13831432 (“‘Combining the captive audience of an airplane, 
including children, with the ease of passengers to view, send, 
and receive indecent and obscene material through the very 
technology that the FCC is considering loosening is a dangerous 
recipe. This is why if wireless and cellular technologies are 
allowed on flights, there must be provisions for banning the use 
of such devices for purposes of viewing, sending, or receiving 
indecent or profane communications.’ Morality in Media, Inc.”); 
7 
Appropriate regulatory responses to these concerns need to 
consider both constitutional limits and the impact of restricting 
the use of cell phones on business productivity.  The possibility 
of maintaining the ban on cell phone use during flight raises 
First Amendment concerns because any future regulations may have 
to rest upon a government interest other than safety.11 
                                                                                                                                            
see also Evan Hansen, XXX, on a Small Screen Near You, CNET 
News.com, Dec. 30, 2004, 
http://news.com.com/XXX%2C+on+a+small+screen+near+you/2100-
1039_3-5502413.html (“Porn after the digital revolution is like 
sand after a day at the beach: Pretty soon you’re finding it 
everywhere – including on the cell phone of the guy one seat over 
during that five-hour flight to New York.”). 
11 See Marguerite Reardon & Ben Charny, Feds Move on Wireless Web, 
Cell Phones in Flight, CNET News.com, Dec. 15, 2004, 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-5491802.html (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2005) (stating that a NASA engineer said in a 2000 
interview that the airplane cell phone ban would be lifted once 
earlier generations of cell phones were no longer in use); see 
also Nicholas A. Sabatini, Associate Administrator for Aviation 
Safety, FAA, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, 
on Cell Phones on Aircraft: Nuisance or Necessity (July 14, 2005) 
(transcript available at 
http://testimony.ost.dot.gov/test/Sabatini2.htm) (last visited on 
8 
This analysis addresses the government’s potential ability 
to maintain its current ban on in-flight cell phone use based on 
decency and privacy interests if the government determines that 
technological safety issues do not continue to preclude their 
use.12  The analysis centers on cell phone Internet browsing, as 
                                                                                                                                            
Nov. 27, 2005) (“This potential to provide passengers with new 
communication technologies also raises the issue of what FCC 
Commissioner Copps refers to as the ‘annoying-seatmate issue.’ . 
. . [I]t’s not hard to imagine a scenario where use of cell 
phones by several passengers in the confined space of an aircraft 
cabin could lead to conflicts.”). 
12 See generally Access Intelligence, LLC, Lifting Ban on Mobile 
Phone Use in Flight – Do So Carefully Warn Commentators, Air 
Safety Week, June 13, 2005, 
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0UBT/is_2005_June_13/a
i_n13831432 (summarizing many safety concerns with in-flight cell 
phone use, but also quoting aviation and cell phone industry 
experts as saying that pico cell technology has the potential, if 
properly applied, of eliminating the technological safety issues 
of cell phone use during flight); see also Sara Kehaulani Goo & 
Keith L. Alexander, In-Flight Calls Could Cause Turbulence, 
Opponents Say, Washington Post, Apr. 8, 2005, at E01 (“The FAA is 
awaiting results of a study, due in December 2006, on whether the 
phones interfere with navigational equipment.”) available at 
9 
opposed to the use of laptops or other personal electronic 
devices.  The analysis concludes that the government cannot 
justify maintaining a total ban on cell phone use during flight 
based purely on decency or privacy concerns. 
Part II provides a brief background on the basic right to 
speech in settings similar to an airplane.  Part III discusses 
possible government justifications for maintaining a ban absent 
safety concerns and examines issues of privacy and the ability to 
avoid unwanted speech encapsulated in the captive audience 
doctrine.  Then Part IV considers the potential applicability of 
a time, place, and manner regulation on in-flight cell phone 
Internet browsing.  Part V concludes with a discussion of the 
extent of permissible regulation in an airplane setting, and what 
regulations would constitute a good compromise between competing 
interests. 
 
II. Background: A Doctrinal Primer for Cell Phones, Speech, and 
Public Transportation 
 
A. Cell Phones are Part of Both Modern Life and Government 
Regulation 
 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/04/08/AR2005040800564.html. 
10 
The next time you are waiting in an airport for a flight, 
stop and take a look around.  More than 163 million Americans own 
cell phones.13  Chances are, as an airline passenger, you may 
encounter people on their cell phones as they wait for their 
flight.  Cell phones and their widespread adoption are recent 
developments.14  Today, cell phones are smaller than the palm of 
your hand and they allow you to make phone calls from virtually 
anywhere, send text messages, take digital pictures, record 
video, send email, and browse the Internet.15 
                                                
13 Jay Cline, Cell Phone Directory Rings True, ComputerWorld, 
Sept. 2, 2004, 
http://www.computerworld.com/mobiletopics/mobile/story/0,10801,95
650,00.html. 
14 Motorola introduced DynaTAC, considered the first mobile 
telephone, in 1983.  Christine Rosen, Our Cell Phones, Ourselves, 
The New Atlantis, 26, 27 (2004) available at 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/6/TNA06-CRosen.pdf (“There 
were approximately 340,000 wireless subscribers in the United 
States in 1985, according to the Cellular Telecommunications and 
Internet Associate (CTIA); by 1995, that number had increased to 
more than 33 million, and by 2003, more than 158 million people 
in the country had gone wireless.”). 
15 See Christine Rosen, Our Cell Phones, Ourselves, The New 
Atlantis, 26, 30 (2004) available at 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/archive/6/TNA06-CRosen.pdf; see 
11 
The FCC has regulated cell phones since their inception 
while the FAA controls the airlines.  Title 1 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 grants the FCC power to create 
bureaus.16  One of those bureaus is Wireless Telecommunications 
Bureaus which “handles nearly all FCC domestic wireless 
telecommunications programs, policies, and outreach initiatives.  
Wireless communications services include . . . [c]ellular [and 
p]ublic [s]afety . . . .”17  The Department of Transportation 
created the FAA.18 
Together, each of these two agencies banned cell phone use 
during flight.  “FCC rules currently ban cell phone use after a 
plane has taken off because of potential interference to cellular 
phone networks on the ground. In addition, the Federal Aviation 
                                                                                                                                            
also Despina Afentouli, New Heights for In-Flight Internet, 
CNN.com, Mar. 31, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TRAVEL/03/31/bt.internet.flight/ (stating 
that German airline carrier Lufthansa installed in-flight 
Internet access last May.  The article goes on to explain that 
in-flight Internet access “works by sending electronic signals 
from planes to orbiting satellites, which are then relayed to 
ground stations.”). 
16 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2005). 
17 See generally http://wireless.fcc.gov (last visited Nov. 27, 
2005). 
18 49 U.S.C. § 106 (2005). 
12 
Administration has rules prohibiting in-flight cell phone use 
because of potential interference to navigation and aircraft 
systems.”19  The FCC instituted its ban on airborne cell phone use 
in 1991.20  While, the FAA currently prohibits the use of cell 
phones, wireless communication devices and other portable 
electronic devices with radio transmitters (like BlackBerry 
handhelds) during flight because of concerns of interference with 
aircraft communications and navigation.21  However, the FAA does 
allow passengers to use personal electronic devices that do not 
have radio transmitters (like portable video games, laptops, and 
                                                
19 Federal Communications Commission, FCC Consumer Advisory: Using 
Your Wireless Phones on Airplanes, Sept. 23, 2005, 
http://ftp.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/cellonplanes.html (last 
visited Nov. 27, 2005). 
20 See Comments of Association of Flight Attendants-CWA, AFL-CIO, 
In the Matter of: Amendment of the Commission’s Rules to 
Facilitate the Use of Cellular Telephones and Other Wireless 
Devices Aboard Airborne Aircraft, Before the FCC, WT Docket No. 
04-435 (May 26, 2005) (available at 
http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-15-
05/friend.pdf). 
21 See Subcommittee on Aviation, Hearing on Cell Phones on 
Aircraft: Nuisance or Necessity? (July 15, 2005) available at 
http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-15-05/07-15-
05memo.html. 
13 
CD/MP3 players) above 10,000 feet.22  All this regulation is 
evidence of how involved the government is in the regulation of 
both cell phones and the airlines. 
 
B. State Action 
 
The First Amendment only restricts state action.23  This 
means that the First Amendment restricts the government but not 
private actors.  The present analysis focuses on government 
regulation and not private action by the airlines.  Any action 
taking by the private airlines remains to be seen.  This focus is 
appropriate because the airline industry is a highly government-
regulated industry where almost any private airline action must 
first meet with government approval.  This means that should the 
airlines choose to take action on their own, this pervasive 
government oversight is important in determining whether the 
                                                
22 See id. 
23 The Constitution prohibits only government from abridging the 
rights of free speech.  The First Amendment provides, in relevant 
part, “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. I. (emphasis added).  And the 
First Amendment applies to the states by virtue of incorporation 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 666 (1925). 
14 
First Amendment also applies to private action by the airlines.24  
Given the competitiveness of the airline industry, an analysis of 
private regulation by the airlines may end up being moot.  Many 
airlines are considering allowing wireless Internet access to 
attract business travelers and increase profitability.25 
 
C. Internet Browsing as Speech 
 
Speech protected by the First Amendment is not limited to a 
person audibly speaking.  Protected speech includes the written 
word as well; books, magazines, newspapers, and writing on a 
                                                
24 In dicta, previous cases have commented that private action in 
highly regulated industries may constitute state action.  “When 
authority derives in part from Government’s thumb on the scales, 
the exercise of that power by private persons becomes closely 
akin, in some respects, to its exercise by Government itself.”  
Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 note 8 
(1952) (citations omitted). 
25 United Airlines received regulatory approval to be the first 
U.S. airline to install Wi-Fi Internet service on its airplanes.  
See Roger Yu, Wi-Fi Net Access Could Soon Land on United Flights, 
USAToday.com, June 6, 2005, 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/biztravel/2005-06-06-united-wi-
fi_x.htm.  “United hopes the service will generate profit and 
attract more passengers.” Id. 
15 
jacket are speech potentially protected by the First Amendment.26  
The Internet is a medium where both written and audible speech is 
available to anyone with an electronic device capable of 
accessing it.  This ability to access such material – e.g. 
browsing the Internet – is closely tied to the First Amendment’s 
protection of speech.27  In a case involving a school board’s 
decision to remove particular books from the library, a plurality 
found that the right to receive information is an “inherent 
corollary” of the First Amendment.28  These Justices also said 
“the Constitution protects the right to receive information and 
ideas.”29  This close constitutional correlation between a 
person’s right to speak and another person’s right to hear that 
                                                
26 See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (finding 
that writing on a jacket is speech for First Amendment 
considerations). 
27 See Glenn Kubota, Public School Usage of Internet Filtering 
Software: Book Banning Reincarnated?, 17 Loy. L.A. Ent. L.J. 687, 
708-09 (1997). 
28 See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he 
right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the 
recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech . . . 
.”) (plurality opinion). 
29 See id. at 867 (plurality opinion) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 
394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). 
16 
speech is why Internet browsing falls under the First Amendment’s 
protection of speech.30 
An example of Internet browsing of speech is evident in 
United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc.31.  The Court 
specifically used a free speech analysis.  In this case the 
constitutionality of a library’s decision to use Internet filter 
software on their publicly accessible computers was challenged.32  
The Court analyzed the library’s Internet access using a freedom 
of speech analysis and held that “Internet access in public 
libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor a ‘designated’ public 
forum.”33 
 
D. Free Speech and Public Transportation 
 
                                                
30 See id. at 867 (“The dissemination of ideas can accomplish 
nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive 
and consider them.  It would be a barren marketplace of ideas 
that had only sellers and no buyers.”) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) 
(BRENNAN, J., concurring)). 
31 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
32 See generally United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, Inc., 539 
U.S. 194 (2003). 
33 Id. at 205 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 
Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)). 
17 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”34  While this text put restraints upon 
the government’s ability to restrict speech, the Supreme Court 
does not interpret this provision as barring all regulation of 
speech.35  The Supreme Court allows great protection for certain 
categories of speech and specifies that other categories of 
speech, such as obscene speech, fall outside of the safeguards of 
the First Amendment.36  However, even indecent speech receives 
First Amendment protection.37  “[T]he government may not prohibit 
                                                
34 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
35 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483-85 (1957) (“[T]he 
unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to 
protect every utterance. . . . There are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment 
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional 
problem.”) (citation omitted). 
36 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“[O]bscene 
material is unprotected by the First Amendment”); see also Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). 
37 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 
811 (2000) (stating that even sexual explicit, but not obscene, 
material receives First Amendment protection). 
18 
or punish speech simply because others might find it offensive,”38 
but the government may regulate it. 
Freedom to engage in expressive activity in all forms on 
public transportation is not a given.  And neither is a total ban 
on expressive activity in a public transportation setting 
obviously in accordance with the protections of the First 
Amendment.  The degree of permissible expressive activity, or its 
regulation, on public transportation involves an analysis of (i) 
the power of Congress to regulate the activity, (ii) the type of 
forum, and (iii) whether the regulation is appropriate given the 
type of forum. 
 
1. Congressional Power to Regulate 
 
Congress’s power to regulate any activity, including 
expressive activity, dealing with the functioning of public 
transportation would likely rest on the Commerce Clause.39  The 
Court’s current interpretation of the Commerce Clause is broad.  
The Commerce Clause allows the federal government to regulate not 
only the transportation of interstate goods, but also any 
                                                
38 Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 
999 (Aspen Law & Business 2002). 
39 “Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States. . . .”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
19 
intrastate activity that has an effect on those interstate 
goods.40 
Interstate public transportation is subject to federal 
regulation.  And airlines are the prototypical example of 
interstate public transportation because the majority of airline 
passengers travel from one state to another.  Other major forms 
of public transportation – trains, automobiles, and buses – may 
not have a similarly high percentage of interstate travel as 
airplanes, but because of the broad constitutional interpretation 
of the Commerce Clause and the effect that intrastate public 
transportation has on interstate commerce, there is little issue 
with the federal government’s power to pass regulations 
concerning public transportation. 
 
2. The Public Transportation Forum 
 
The next step in a general free speech on public 
transportation analysis by the courts is determining the type of 
forum of the location.  The Court has identified three types of 
fora – the traditional public forum, the government-designated 
                                                
40 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 
(1964); see also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
20 
forum, and the nonpublic forum.41  Traditional public fora are 
typically public streets and parks; the places which “by long 
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and 
debate.”42  In contrast to traditional public fora, which by their 
very nature are open to speech, the government can also designate 
a place for use by the public for assembly and speech.43  A 
government-designated forum is one that is open for use by 
certain speakers or for certain subjects.44  Importantly though, 
“[t]he government does not create a public forum by inaction or 
by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally 
opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.”45  The Court 
looks at the policy and practice of the government regarding the 
                                                
41 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 802 (1985); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983). 
42 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 
37, 45 (1983). 
43 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 802 (1985). 
44 See id.  An example of a government-designated public forum is 
an outdoor concert theater for music.  The government could limit 
the speakers and subject to music only, banning political or 
religious speakers from using the theater. 
45 Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 
460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). 
21 
location in question or the nature of the property and its 
compatibility with the expressive activity o determine whether 
the government created a forum.46 
In Leman v. City of Shaker Heights47 the Court addressed 
speech on city transit buses.  Leman concerned the city denying a 
politician access to advertising space on the city’s buses even 
though there was space available.48  The city had denied 
advertising to politicians for 26 years.49  But the Court did not 
see this as a violation of the First Amendment because the 
advertising space on the bus was not a public forum.  The Court 
found that the city’s use of the property as a commercial 
enterprise, i.e. raising revenue dollars through advertising, was 
inconsistent with an intent to designate that space on the city 
buses as a public forum.50  This holding agreed with the Supreme 
                                                
46 Id. 
47 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
48 See generally Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 
(1974). 
49 See id. at 299-300. 
50 See id. at 303; cf. Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 
451 (1952) (applying the First and Fifth Amendments to a private 
company operating a street railway and bus system in the District 
of Columbia and piping music, announcements, and commercial 
advertising over a speaker system in the cars.  However, the 
Court did not directly classify the forum of the railcars or 
22 
Court of Ohio’s holding in the case which concluded that “the 
constitutionally protected right of free speech with respect to 
forums for oral speech, or the dissemination of literature on a 
city’s street, does not extend to commercial or political 
advertising on rapid transit vehicles.”51 
The Court has been reluctant to expand traditional public 
fora beyond streets and public parks, often due to the historical 
or time component needed to establish something as a public 
forum.52  Following this rationale and the cases above, the courts 
would likely conclude that an airplane is not a traditional 
public forum.  Therefore, airplanes are either a government-
designated forum or, more likely, a nonpublic forum and are then 
potentially subject to greater government regulation of speech. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
buses, but in applying Constitutional limitations it suggests 
that the Court viewed the forum as either a public forum or a 
designated forum.). 
51 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 301 (1974) 
(citing 296 N.E.2d 683 (1973)) (emphasis added). 
52 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 817 (1985); see also Haque v. Comm. for Idus. Org., 307 U.S. 
496, 515 (1939) (stating that traditional public fora are those 
that "time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, 
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public 
questions"). 
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3. Constitutional Regulations Given the Forum 
 
Upon determining the type of forum, it is necessary to 
address whether the government regulation is constitutional 
according to the appropriate forum-specific test.53  Since an 
airplane is not a traditional public forum, the two potentially 
relevant analyses are those for a government-designated forum and 
a nonpublic forum. 
In a government-designated forum it is necessary for a 
regulation to be content-neutral54 and for the government to have 
a compelling interest.55  Whereas “[a]ccess to a nonpublic forum . 
. . can be restricted as long as the restrictions are reasonable 
and [are] not an effort to suppress expression . . . .”56  In a 
                                                
53 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 800 (1985) (“[T]he extent to which the Government can 
control access depends on the nature of the relevant forum.”). 
54 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 784 (1989).  
There is are exceptions to content-neutrality in such areas as 
obscenity, child pornography, fighting words, and secondary 
effects associated with adult businesses; however, for speech 
that is fully protected by the First Amendment, the regulations 
must be content-neutral.  Id. 
55 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 800 (1985). 
56 See id. 
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case involving a First Amendment challenge to a ban of 
solicitations within airport terminals, the Court held that the 
airport terminal was a nonpublic forum.57  As a nonpublic forum, a 
government regulation would only have to satisfy a requirement of 
reasonableness.58 
Beyond the forum, an analysis of the constitutionality of 
the government’s ban on cell phone use during flight requires the 
consideration of several additional factors.  One factor is the 
applicable case law concerning the location – an enclosed area 
with relatively limited ability to relocate - which may create 
conflicts with unwilling listeners or minors.  This issue is 
addressed by the captive audience doctrine.  Another factor is 
the type of government regulation – i.e. whether it is a content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulation or a reasonable 
regulation of a nonpublic forum. 
                                                
57 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 
U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992) (holding that airports are a nonpublic 
forum because they have not been held out for expressive activity 
“immemorially . . . time out of mind,”  and that the continued 
litigation concerning expressive activity in airports evidences 
operators’ objections countering assertions of a designated 
forum). 
58 See id. (“The restriction need only be reasonable; it need not 
be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.”) 
(citation omitted). 
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III. The Collision Between a Captive Audience and Free Speech 
Rights 
 
This section addresses three topics: (i) whether someone 
accessing the Internet on a cell phone in an enclosed area, like 
an airplane, falls under what the Court calls the captive 
audience doctrine, (ii) how the Court balances privacy and 
speech, and (iii) the considerations of the Court when minors are 
part of the audience. 
 
A. What Makes an Audience Captive? 
 
Traditionally, captive audience doctrine applies to a 
situation where the listener has no choice but to hear (or see, 
in the case of visual speech) the undesired speech.59  A captive 
audience may allow the government greater latitude in regulating 
the speech within constitutional boundaries.  The factors 
                                                
59 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974); cf. 
Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (using, for the first time, the term “captive 
audience,” in this case referring to an audience on a public 
street involuntarily listening to a minister); see also Close v. 
Lederle, 424 F.2d 988, 991 (1st Cir. 1970) (“Freedom of speech 
must recognize, at least within limits, freedom not to listen.”). 
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considered in finding an audience to be captive are: (i) the 
location of the speech - containing a strong spatial component,60 
(ii) the intrusiveness of the speech – often based on how loud or 
how visible,61 and (iii) the ability or effort required by an 
unwilling listener to avoid the speech.62 
The general purpose of the captive audience doctrine is to 
ensure that “free speech rights do not stand as an absolute bar 
to government’s discretion to decide to favor the unwilling 
                                                
60 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 
(1952) (Blackmun, J.); id. at 306-08 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
61 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11, n. 
6 (1975) (“[I]t may not be the content of the speech, as much as 
the deliberate ‘verbal or visual assault,’ that justifies 
proscription.”) (citation and brackets omitted); see also Lehman 
v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1952) (Blackmun, 
J.); id. at 306-08 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
62 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000)  “[T]he 
protection afforded to offensive messages does not always embrace 
offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience 
cannot avoid it.”  Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 
487 (1988)).  See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 
(1971) (recognizing that using a right to privacy to allow 
regulation of speech that is easily avoidable, like writing on a 
jacket, is not constitutional). 
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listener over the unpleasant speaker.”63  The Supreme Court has 
said “we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes.”64  
However, under the Court’s captive audience doctrine, certain 
factors temper the government’s discretion to “favor the 
unwilling listener” by regulating the speech through content-
based or time, place, or manner regulations.65 
One such factor is location.  The Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the First Amendment gives the government 
greater ability to protect people in their homes from intrusive 
speech.  The Court has said, “surely [the interest of being free 
from unwanted expression in public] is nothing like the interest 
in being free from unwanted expression in the confines of one’s 
own home.”66  However, this location/spatial factor is not the 
only consideration in finding a captive audience.  While the 
spatial factor is part of the Court’s consideration in finding a 
captive audience, another factor to focus on, especially in 
                                                
63 William D. Araiza, Captive Audiences, Children and the 
Internet, 41 Brandeis L.J. 397, 404 (2003) (emphasis added). 
64 Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970). 
65 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (“[T]he mere 
presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not 
serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of 
giving offense”) (citation omitted). 
66 Id. at 21-22. 
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situations outside the home, is the listener’s ability to avoid 
the unwanted speech.67 
 
1. Location, Location, Location: The Spatial Factor of 
the Captive Audience Doctrine 
 
The Supreme Court first applied the captive audience 
doctrine in cases involving speech intruding upon an unwilling 
listener’s home.  This led some commentators to conclude that the 
captive audience doctrine is essentially one focused on a home 
setting.68  The typical example of a captive audience is one who 
is the subject of intrusive speech at his residence – such as 
residential picketing69 or mail.70  However, courts recognize that 
                                                
67 See generally id. (holding that unwilling audience could avert 
their eyes from the writing on jacket). 
68 See Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 
Hastings Const. L.Q. 85, 90 (1991); Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 845 (Aspen Law & 
Business 2002). 
69 See generally Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding 
a narrow reading of a state law banning picketing in residential 
neighborhoods to protect those who were presumptively unwilling 
to receive such speech); Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 
512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding the part of an injunction 
29 
a captive audience can exist outside the home.  For example, 
courts have applied the doctrine in cases involving bus 
advertisements71 and radio communication in a streetcar.72 
                                                                                                                                            
restricting the audible speech of protesters that recovering 
patients could not reasonably avoid). 
70 Cf. Bolger v. Young’s Drug Products Co., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) 
(finding unconstitutional a federal law that prevented the 
unsolicited mailing of contraceptive information because 
“[r]ecipients of objectionable mailings . . . may effectively 
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities [through a] . . 
. journey from mail box to trash can”) (internal quotation 
omitted) (citations omitted), and Rowan v. United States Post 
Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970) (holding that a mailer’s 
right to communicate had to stop at the mailbox of an unreceptive 
addressee because “[t]o hold less would tend to license a form of 
trespass and would make hardly more sense than to say that a 
radio or television viewer may not twist the dial to cut off an 
offensive or boring communication and thus bar its entering his 
home”). 
71 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
72 See Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (stating 
that passengers of city streetcars and buses had to get to work, 
often had no other alternatives to public transportation, and 
could not ignore the speech and therefore were captive audiences) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
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During the infancy of the captive audience doctrine there 
was no concept of the spatial factor that is so important in 
today’s application of the doctrine.  Justice Jackson’s dissent 
in Kuntz v. New York73 first used the term captive audience.  The 
majority of the Court did not apply the captive audience doctrine 
to Kuntz because the case involved a minister speaking on a 
public street.74  The Court has been reluctant to apply the 
captive audience doctrine to publicly accessible places.75  In 
another early, Wolin v. Port of New York Authority,76 the first 
outline of the spatial factor beginning to develop.  Wolin 
involved speech in a bus terminal and succinctly summarizes when 
restrictions on speech may be permissible in a public but 
enclosed setting: 
 
                                                
73 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951). 
74 Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 298 (1951) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
75 See Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (1968) 
(finding that a transit station did not constitute a captive 
audience just because it had a roof, but was architecturally 
similar to a public street that happened to be underground); 
Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (stating 
that music transmitted in buses and streetcars did not infringe 
on the First Amendment rights of the passengers). 
76 392 F.2d 83 (1968). 
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[W]here the issue involves the exercise of First 
Amendment rights in a place clearly available to the 
general public, the inquiry must go further: does the 
character of the place, the pattern of usual activity, 
the nature of its essential purpose and the population 
who take advantage of the general invitation extended, 
make it an appropriate place for communication.77 
 
The use of the spatial factor in Wolin to determine if 
there is a captive audience is evident - “the enclosed design of 
the forum will affect the degree of restriction on communication 
tolerable under the Constitution.”78  While this spatial component 
is one factor in a captive audience analysis, another 
consideration is how easily the unwilling listener – who is 
perhaps spatially close – can avoid the speech.79 
 
2. Avoidability: The Intrusiveness of the Speech and 
the Captive’s Opportunity to Avoid it 
                                                
77 Id. at 89. 
78 Id. at 93. 
79 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 
(1952) (Blackmun, J.); id. at 306-08 (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(recognizing the tension between the right of a person to speak 
and the rights of an unwilling listener not to be “forced” to 
listen). 
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The failure to find a captive audience usually arises 
because of the listener’s ability to avoid the unwanted speech.80  
There are two interrelated factors in evaluating the avoidability 
of the speech – the intrusiveness of the speech and the effort 
involved by the potential “captive” to avoid the speech.81 
Because speech comes in many forms, it can be unavoidable 
in a variety of ways.  For example, speech can be intrusive and 
potentially unavoidable because of the volume or the size of the 
visual aid the speaker uses.  In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 
Inc.,82 one of the issues was the volume of the protestors outside 
a women’s health clinic.83  In that case the Court upheld a noise 
injunction against picketers outside a clinic reasoning that 
                                                
80 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73 
(1994) (upholding the part of the injunction restricting the 
audible speech of protesters but striking down the part of the 
injunction restricting the use of “images observable” because of 
the ease with which patients could avoid them, by closing the 
blinds). 
81 See id. 
82 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
83 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 759-60 
(1994). 
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recovering patients could not avoid speech at high volumes.84  
Because of this unavoidability the Court upheld the injunction of 
the volume of the protestors.85 
The Court seems more likely to deem that audible speech is 
unavoidable while potentially intrusive visible speech is not 
unavoidable.86  For example, in one case the Court held that a 
drive-in theater screen visible to the public was not 
unavoidable.87  This is just one example very visible speech still 
being avoidable. 
                                                
84 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 772-73 
(1994) (upholding the part of an injunction restricting the 
audible speech of protesters that recovering patients could not 
reasonably avoid.  “The First Amendment does not demand that 
patients at a medical facility undertake Herculean efforts to 
escape the cacophony of political protests.  ‘If overamplified 
loud-speakers assault the citizenry, government may turn them 
down.’”) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 
(1972)). 
85 See id. 
86 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 773 
(1994) (“[I]t is much easier for the [unwilling listener] to pull 
[the] curtains [to avoid visible speech] than for the [unwilling 
listener] to stop up her ears . . .”). 
87 In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), the 
government tried to defend a city ordinance making the exhibition 
34 
Along with unavoidability, the Court analyzes the effort 
required to avoid the unwanted speech before holding that an 
audience is captive.  The best example of the analysis of the 
effort to avoid speech appears in Erznoznik.88  Erznoznik involved 
the prosecution of a drive-in movie theatre and its operator.89  
Under a Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance, the exhibition of films 
containing nudity was a punishable offense as a public nuisance 
if the screen was visible from a public street or place outside 
the property.90  The Court looked at both how “obtrusive” the 
speech, in this case the movie theatre screen, was and how easily 
viewers could avoid the speech.91  The Court found that even a 
                                                                                                                                            
of “any motion picture . . . in which the human male or female 
bare buttocks, human female bare breasts, or human bare pubic 
areas are shown” by a drive-in movies theater visible from public 
streets or public places a public nuisance, Id. at 207, based on 
“protect[ing] its citizens against unwilling exposure to 
materials that may be offensive.”  Id. at 208.  However, the 
Court held that “the screen of a drive-in theater is not ‘so 
obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to 
avoid exposure to it.’”  Id. at 212 (quoting Redrup v. New York, 
386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967)) (emphasis added). 
88 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
89 See id. 
90 See generally id. 
91 See id. at 208-12. 
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drive-in movie theater screen was not “so obtrusive as to make it 
impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it.”92  
The burden normally falls on the unwitting viewer to avoid 
exposure, where practicable, by “simply by averting [his] eyes.”93 
The Court applied the reasoning in Erznoznik to more 
enclosed settings.  In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, both the 
plurality and concurring opinions recognized that the degree of 
captivity and the resultant intrusion on privacy is significantly 
                                                
92 See id. at 212 (quoting Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 
(1967)); but see Cactus Corp. v. State of Arizona, 480 P.2d 375, 
379 (1971) (“A drive-in theatre is capable of imposing its 
pictures upon persons without their consent . . . . [W]e conceive 
of no reason why [the drive-in theatre] cannot be prohibited from 
polluting the neighborhood with visual material harmful to 
children.”). 
93 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971); see Erznoznik v. 
City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211 (1975); see also Frisby 
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (“[I]n many locations, [the 
Supreme Court] expects individuals simply to avoid speech they do 
not want to hear”) (citation omitted); Bolger v. Youngs Drug 
Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (stating that unwanted 
mail is easily avoided by merely throwing it out); Consolidated 
Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n of New York, 447 U.S. 530, 
542 (1980). 
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greater for a passenger on a bus than for a person on the 
street.94 
 
3. Application of the Captive Audience Doctrine to 
Cell Phone Internet Access in an Airplane 
 
If the unwilling listener on the airplane is captive, then 
this gives the government greater justification in imposing 
regulations on speakers.95  A captive audience might justify the 
government in maintaining the ban on cell phones in-flight.  
However, this is a superficial application of the captive 
audience doctrine.  Even given that an airplane is close quarters 
and that a passenger is definitely captive in the sense that he 
cannot just get up and leave, this does not assure a finding of a 
captive audience.  Because unwilling listeners can easily avoid 
cell phone Internet browsing, the captive audience doctrine does 
not apply.  Even one of the largest cell phones only has a screen 
                                                
94 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 
(1952) (Blackmun, J.); id. at 306-08 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
95 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) 
(stating that selective restrictions of speech can be upheld if 
the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling 
viewer to avoid exposure (citing Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-04 (1952))). 
37 
that is approximately 2.5 inches wide by 2.71 inches high.96  
These screens are not exactly as large as a drive-in theatre 
screen, where the Court did not find the visual speech 
unavoidable.97  To get an accurate idea of images on such a small 
screen would require effort seeking out that speech.  The effort 
to avoid such visual cell phone speech, even in close quarters, 
is practically nil.98  Since this visual cell phone speech, even 
if unwanted, and even if in close quarters where one cannot leave 
or relocate, is so easily avoided, it is unlikely that a 
passenger is captive under these particular facts.99 
                                                
96 Cingular Wireless sells a BlackBerry 7100g, one of the mobile 
devices with the largest screen – 240 x 260 pixels (2.5 x 2.71 
inches.  Cingular Wireless, Online Store, 
http://onlinestorez.cingular.com/cell-phone-service/cell-
phones/cell-phones.jsp?source=INC230063&_requestid=94064 (enter 
zip code when prompt; then scroll down to BlackBerry 7100g) (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
97 See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
98 See id. at 221 (“In the case of newspapers and magazines, there 
must be some seeking by the one who is to see”) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
99 Passengers can avoid written advertisements, as opposed to 
auditory speech, by simply not looking at them and therefore any 
“captive” audience considerations should yield to First Amendment 
rights.  Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 320-21 
38 
However, this reasoning becomes more strained the larger 
the visible screen becomes, like with, for example, laptops or 
portable DVD players.  Portable DVD players have screens that can 
be as large as 9 inches diagonally and laptop computers can have 
screens as large as 19 inches diagonally.  Even with these larger 
visible areas, they are still avoidable by the unwilling viewer.  
For example, in a case involving male firefighters looking at a 
Playboy magazine in the firehouse in the presence of female 
firefighters the court found that the unwilling viewers were not 
a captive audience because they could easily avert their eyes.100 
                                                                                                                                            
(1952) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Also the Court has drawn a 
distinction between newspapers and periodicals, which are easily 
avoided, and are even more observable by a surrounding audience 
than visual images on a cell phone, and billboards or streetcar 
signs which are not as easily avoided by an unwilling listener.  
See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302 (1974) 
(referencing Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105 (1932)).  
Applying this logic to passengers on an airplane, it is difficult 
to rationalize applying the captive audience doctrine to visual 
images on a cell phone, regardless of the spatial setting because 
the images are so easily avoided by an unwilling viewer. 
100 See Johnson v. County of Los Angeles Fire Department, 1994 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8270, 24, note 6 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that 
“[i]ndividuals who may avoid material by averting their eyes are 
not a ‘captive audience’”). 
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The situation is slightly more complicated if the cell 
phone use constitutes audible speech.  Audible speech is much 
harder to avoid than visual speech,101 and it is therefore more 
likely that a passenger is a captive audience.102  However, the 
largest challenge for the government is distinguishing audible 
cell phone use from conversations between passengers or 
announcements from the captain over the airplane’s speakers.103 
                                                
101 See Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) 
(upholding the part of an injunction prohibiting picketers from 
making excessive noise outside an abortion clinic based in part 
that patients were a captive audience and the speech was not 
easily avoided, but striking down the part of the injunction that 
prohibited observable messages because that speech is easily 
avoided by closing the blinds). 
102 See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
103 See Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 
(1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“One who is in a public vehicle 
may not of course complain of the noise of the crowd and the 
babble of tongues.  One who enters any public place sacrifices 
some of his privacy”).  The degree of interference caused by the 
unwanted speech should be considered.  If the speech does not 
interfere with the business or privacy expectations of the 
customers, then the speech should not be proscribed.  See 
generally In re Hoffman, 67 Cal. 2d 845, 434 P.2d 353 (1967).  
40 
When the FCC and FAA instituted the ban on cell phone use 
during flight in was because of safety, which is a weighty 
government interest.104  However, once this brick is removed from 
the scales, the balancing of First Amendment freedom of speech 
rights and constitutionally allowable regulation of such speech 
is much more difficult.  The captive audience doctrine could 
provide the government with more weight on the side of the scale 
favoring regulation. 
However, in light of the analysis above, it seems unlikely 
that the Court would apply the captive audience doctrine to 
audible cell phone speech because it is virtually 
indistinguishable, constitutionally, from conversations between 
passengers.105  Additionally, unwilling passengers subjected to 
                                                
104 See supra note 13. 
105 There are differences between a conversation between two 
passengers – an airplane conversation - and a conversation 
between one passenger and someone on the ground via a cell phone 
– an in-flight cell phone conversation.  However, it seems that 
there might be greater reasons for protecting an in-flight cell 
phone conversation rather than an airplane conversation. 
First, during an airplane conversation both speaker and listener 
are in the same physical location so they expect their speech to 
be subject to the same restrictions.  But with an in-flight cell 
phone conversation any restrictions placed on the airline 
passenger are “felt” by the person on the ground.  So if the 
41 
visual cell phone use are even less likely to qualify as a 
captive audience due to the ease with which they can avert their 
eyes.  Importantly, the government currently does not regulate 
the use of laptops, magazines, or portable DVD players during 
flight, which are harder to avoid than cell phones because of 
their larger displays.  Since laptops, magazines, and portable 
DVD players do not pose a safety concern because they do not 
transmit radio signals, the government has not imposed an in-
flight ban.106  In would seem incongruous to try to use the 
                                                                                                                                            
government restricts passengers from using the word bomb in any 
context, this will affect the person on the ground’s ability to 
hear any speech containing that word even though that person is 
not on an airplane and the same safety concerns do not apply to 
that person. 
Second, a third party who is unwillingly listening to the 
conversation is forced to avoid twice as much speech in an 
airplane conversation as opposed to an in-flight cell phone 
conversation where only one side of the conversation is 
discernable. 
On first blush it seems that there is more justification for 
regulating an airplane conversation than there is for regulating 
an in-flight cell phone conversation when technological safety is 
not the issue. 
106 See Subcommittee on Aviation, Hearing on Cell Phones on 
Aircraft: Nuisance or Necessity? (July 15, 2005) available at 
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captive audience doctrine to justify a government-imposed 
regulation on cell phone use in-flight when there is not similar 
regulations for non-transmitting laptops, magazines, or portable 
DVD players.107 
 
B. Privacy (and Personal Autonomy) . . . Outside the Home? 
 
Another, not altogether separate, factor in cases involving 
unwilling listeners is the listener’s right to privacy.  The 
right to privacy involves personal autonomy and the right not to 
                                                                                                                                            
http://www.house.gov/transportation/aviation/07-15-05/07-15-
05memo.html. 
107 The incongruity exists because laptops, magazines, and 
portable DVD players are as capable of displaying – either 
audibly or visually – indecent or offensive material as a cell 
phone with Internet capability.  The government may try and 
justify the continuation of the in-flight cell phone ban based on 
protecting minors or other captive audience members from indecent 
or offensive speech.  However, if the government has not imposed 
the same indecency restrictions on laptops, magazines, or 
portable DVD players then the statute is unconstitutionally 
under-inclusive.  A ban on cell phone use during flight justified 
by indecency concerns is under-inclusiveness because it fails to 
address the potential indecency seen on laptops and portable DVD 
players. 
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be forced to listen to unwanted speech.108  Recognition of such 
rights risk impeding upon free speech.  Therefore a certain 
balancing between the privacy rights and free speech rights must 
be done.109  In considering this “intersection between the . . . 
protection of . . . privacy and the First Amendment’s protection 
of an individual’s right to receive, and consider, information 
                                                
108 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (“[T]he 
individual’s right to read or observe what he pleases . . . is . 
. . fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty”); see also 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 652 (2003) (“[T]here are . . . 
spheres of a person’s lives and existence, outside the home, 
where the State should not be a dominant presence.  Freedom 
extends beyond spatial bounds.  Liberty presumes an autonomy of 
self.”). 
109 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (“The 
dissenters . . . appear to consider recognizing any of the 
interest of unwilling listeners – let alone balancing those 
interests against the rights of speakers – to be 
unconstitutional.  Our cases do not support this view.”); see 
also Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975) 
(stating that the Court “has considered analogous issues – 
pitting the First Amendment rights of speakers against the 
privacy rights of those who may be unwilling viewers or auditors 
– in a variety of contexts.  Such cases demand delicate 
balancing.”) (citations omitted). 
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and ideas,”110 the Court is very protective of the unwilling 
listener in their home.111   However, regulations favoring an 
unwilling listener over a person exercising free speech outside 
the home are less likely to be held constitutional.112 
“The recognizable privacy interest in avoiding unwanted 
communication varies widely in different settings.”113  In 
locations accessible to more people it is important to remember 
that “[o]ne who is in a public vehicle may not of course complain 
                                                
110 United States v. Extreme Associates, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 
578, 589 (2005). 
111 See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988); see also 
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728, 736 
(1970) (“[T]he right of every person ‘to be let alone’ must be 
placed in the scales with the right of others to communicate.”). 
112 See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 
U.S. 357 (1997) (upholding a fixed 15 foot buffer zone around the 
clinic’s entrances where abortion demonstrators were prohibited, 
but striking down a floating 15 foot no-protest buffer zone 
around a person or vehicle seeking access or leaving the clinic); 
cf. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding a statute 
providing an eight foot buffer zone around people entering a 
health care facility as a valid restriction on speech, serving a 
significant governmental interest). 
113 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000). 
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of the noise of the crowd and the babble of tongues.  One who 
enters any public place sacrifices some of his privacy.”114 
 
C. Minors as Part of the Captured 
 
The above discussion of the application of the captive 
audience doctrine did not thoroughly address the additional 
complications posed by minors in the audience.  Minors often 
introduce unique considerations.  The Court has found that 
children can be treated differently than adults across a broad 
range of areas – such as marriage, voting, military service, and 
drinking to name a few. 
There are many cases discussing captive audience generally, 
but none make specific references to minors being part of the 
captured.  However, in Ginsberg115 Justice Stewart’s concurrence 
stated that the “free trade of ideas” required that listeners 
have the ability to choose what to listen to.116  Such choice 
depends on the ability to avoid or tune out the unwanted speech 
according to Justice Stewart.  He then compared a minor to a 
                                                
114 Public Utilities Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (1952) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
115 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
116 See id. at 649 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing Abrams v. 
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting)). 
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captive audience in that both lacked this choice, one because of 
captivity and the other because of immaturity.117 
Then there are cases that discuss the issues of free speech 
that impact minors.  Access to the Internet by minors, due to its 
rapid adoption by youth and massive amount of information – 
educational, entertaining, useful, offensive, and even obscene – 
that is accessible, and the associated regulation is 
constitutionally difficult.118 
The important aspect of these cases as they pertain to the 
use of cell phones during flight is in determining the relative 
weight of the government interest for supporting the ban if 
minors are on the plane.  The Court has found a constitutional 
right for parents to control what their children see.119  But it 
is unclear whether this right would extend so far as to support a 
                                                
117 See id. at 639. 
118 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 
(2002); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also United States 
v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (holding that the 
installation of Internet filters removable upon the request of 
patrons did not violate the First Amendment). 
119 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see also, e.g., Ginsberg v. New 
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972) (holding that Amish parents could not be compelled to send 
their children to a certain level of schooling). 
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ban on cell phones but still allow the use of laptops, magazines 
and portable DVD players – all of which could pose the same 
concerns of indecency. 
 
IV. Regulating Cell Phone Internet Access Through Time, Place, 
and Manner Restrictions: Can the Government Make You Hang Up? 
 
No forum for speech is without boundaries or regulation.120  
“[P]rotected speech is not equally permissible in all places and 
at all times . . . without regard to the nature of the property 
or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s 
activities.”121  For example, time, place, and manner regulations 
are a way to make speech orderly and understandable without 
suppressing ideas, no matter how unpopular.  Such regulations 
must be (i) content-neutral, (ii) narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and (iii) leaves open ample 
alternative channels for communication.122  However, the strict 
                                                
120 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 799 (1985) (“Even protected speech is not equally 
permissible in all places and at all times.”). 
121 Id. at 799-800. 
122 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 
293 (1984); see also United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 
(1968) (explaining that a regulation on free expression may be 
upheld if it furthers a substantial government interest, is 
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scrutiny of this doctrine is only applicable to an airplane if a 
court determines that an airplane is a government-designated 
forum.  Otherwise, for a nonpublic forum the government 
regulation only has to be reasonable – i.e. not requiring narrow 
tailoring or leaving open ample alternative channels for 
communication.  However, even in a nonpublic forum regulations 
must be viewpoint neutral.123 
 
A. Content and Viewpoint Neutrality 
 
“The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, 
in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in 
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.  The 
                                                                                                                                            
content-neutral, and narrowly tailored); City of Renton v. 
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Frisby v. Schultz, 
487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988). 
123 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“Control over access to a nonpublic forum 
can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as 
the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose 
served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”) (citing Perry 
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 
(1983)). 
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government’s purpose is the controlling consideration.”124  The 
current ban on in-flight cell phone use is content neutral.125  
The ban makes no reference as to the content of the speech, but 
rather bans a particular mode of communication - the manner - 
when the airplane’s – the place - doors close - the time.  The 
Court has upheld bans that “distinguish[ed] between speakers . . 
. based only upon the manner in which [the] speakers 
transmit[ted] their messages to viewers, and not upon the 
messages they carr[ied].”126 
While captive audience doctrine and privacy considerations 
may not justify government restrictions, the government may still 
try to regulate in-flight cell phone use by relying on the 
reasoning in Ward v. Rock Against Racism.127  In Ward, New York 
city officials attempted to regulate the volume of amplified 
music.  The Court held that this was a valid exercise of a 
content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction because the 
government had a strong interest in protecting the privacy of 
                                                
124 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
125 See supra note 13.  The bans are on all radio transmission 
devices during flight and in no way refer to the content; 
therefore the current regulations banning cell phone use in-
flight are content-neutral. 
126 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 645 
(1994). 
127 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
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those living in homes nearby.  The city could “act to protect 
even such traditional public forums as city streets and parks 
from excessive noise.”128  By extension, the government could 
argue that there is an interest in maintaining a reasonable 
volume in an enclosed area like an airplane, especially 
considering that one cannot just get up and leave.  This may 
support a volume regulation of cell phone Internet usage, or the 
requirement to use headphones, but Ward did not contain a total 
ban.  Therefore Ward is not helpful to support maintaining a 
total ban for the benefit of noise reduction. 
 
B. Regulation Advancing a Government Interest 
 
This element is much more variable and dependent upon a 
variety of fact-driven considerations.  Factors include: “the 
nature of the speech activity being regulated; the perceived 
significance of the governmental interest; the scope of the 
restriction; the availability of effective, but less restrictive 
alternatives; and the court’s judgment as to the actual 
effectiveness of the restriction in advancing the proffered 
interest.”129 
                                                
128 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (citing 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1949)). 
129 BOOK – Ides and May, pp. 369 § 8.4.2 
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In determining the nature of the speech activity, the Court 
is much more sympathetic to claimed violations of First Amendment 
rights when the mode of communication is more traditional.130  In 
Watchtower,131 the Court began by noting that the speech at issue 
was highly valued and had “historical importance . . . for the 
dissemination ideas.”132  While cell phone use, especially for 
Internet browsing, lacks the important historical aspect that the 
Court looks for in important speech activities and forums,133 it 
does represent an increasingly important mode of communication in 
modern life. 
Cases finding that particular speech activities are 
important vary.  Speaking to people by displaying a sign in one’s 
                                                
130 See Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. 
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002) (striking down an 
ordinance requiring a permit to engage in door-to-door 
solicitations or neighborhood canvassing); City of Ladue v. 
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) (striking down a city ordinance 
prohibiting homeowners from display signs on their property 
unless they fell under particular exemptions). 
131 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. 
Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002). 
132 Id. at 162. 
133 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 802 (1985). 
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front yard is an important speech activity.134  Demonstrating 
dissatisfaction through protest and picketing is an important 
speech activity.135  Reading newspapers, magazines, or other 
periodicals is an important speech activity. 
The Internet is a virtual public square where similar such 
activities take place electronically.  One can enter this virtual 
square, through a computer or cell phone, and choose to read a 
particular electronic newspaper, blog,136 or personal webpage.  
All these forms of communication in their more traditional 
format, whether it is in books, signs, or speeches on the street 
corner, are protected as important speech activities.  It seems 
difficult to see how the right to speak or listen is changed by 
the fact that the speech now exists in an electronic format, 
unless the government has a reasonable interest particular to 
this electronic mode of communication. 
                                                
134 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994). 
135 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); see also Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Frisby v. 
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
136 A blog is the common term used for a web-log, which is an 
electronic diary where a person posts their thoughts, ideas, or 
pictures in a relatively unformatted, almost stream of 
consciousness, fashion. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=blog. 
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Traditionally, the government interest in restricting 
access to such electronic speech through the use of cell phones 
during an airplane flight was significant – public safety and 
reliable communication.  The FCC’s primary concern is “possible 
disruption of cell phone communication on the ground.”137  The 
FAA’s worry is that “cell phones might interfere with a plane’s 
navigation and electrical systems.”138  NASA noted at least four 
years ago that cell phones are being designed such that “they 
emitted remarkably fewer interference-causing spurious radio 
                                                
137 Marguerite Reardon and Ben Charny, Feds Move on Wireless Web, 
Cell Phones in Flight, CNET News.com Dec. 15, 2004, available at 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-5491802.html; see also David 
Armstrong, Airlines Could Allow Chatter FCC Reconsidering Ban on 
In-Flight Calls, Starting to Ask Travelers What They Think, San 
Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 28, 2005, Page C-1, available at 
http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/04/28/BUGECCBEKN61.DTL&type=business 
138 Marguerite Reardon and Ben Charny, Feds Move on Wireless Web, 
Cell Phones in Flight, CNET News.com Dec. 15, 2004, available at 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-5491802.html; see also David 
Armstrong, Airlines Could Allow Chatter FCC Reconsidering Ban on 
In-Flight Calls, Starting to Ask Travelers What They Think, San 
Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 28, 2005, Page C-1, available at 
http://sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/04/28/BUGECCBEKN61.DTL&type=business 
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signals.”139  If technological improvements and scientific studies 
demonstrate that using cell phones during flight is safe, then 
the government would need to put forth another interest to 
justify a ban.  The substantial interests that the government is 
likely to use to try and justify maintaining a ban would be (i) 
protecting the privacy/comfort of a captive audience, (ii) 
protect unwilling listeners, especially children, from being 
subjected to offensive and potentially indecent speech or (iii) 
because such use may increase passenger-flight attendant 
confrontations. 
Protecting an adult audience from potentially offensive 
cell phone Internet speech in an airplane based on the fact that 
they are a captive audience cannot be sustained.140  However, it 
is a closer call whether protecting minors from potentially 
offensive cell phone Internet speech in an enclosed setting is a 
reasonable government interest.  The Court has failed to 
articulate a clear rule.  Some cases have held that the 
                                                
139 Marguerite Reardon and Ben Charny, Feds Move on Wireless Web, 
Cell Phones in Flight, CNET News.com Dec. 15, 2004, available at 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-5491802.html 
140 See supra Part III; see generally Public Utilities Commission 
of the District of Columbia v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) 
(holding that the government could continue to permit audio, 
consisting of music, talk, and commercials, to be played through 
speakers in streetcars and buses). 
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government should just provide parents with the opportunities to 
shield their children from certain speech if they so choose.141  
Other cases seem to suggest that the government may have an 
interest, independent that of the parents, in protecting minors. 
Beyond the issue of whether the government has an 
independent interest in protecting minors, it seems that any 
regulation maintaining a total ban based on this interest would 
fail to be narrowly tailored.  Again, however, in a nonpublic 
forum narrow tailoring is not required, just a reasonable 
interest in regulation.142  The Court has struck down other 
regulations aimed at protecting minors that were not even total 
bans.  In Playboy143 the government was concerned about the impact 
of bleed-over from adult channels on children viewers.  The Court 
discussed how there were more narrowly tailored options, such as 
providing lock boxes that would totally block out the channels to 
parents who requested them.144 
                                                
141 See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 
(2000) (holding that providing households with the opportunity to 
request better measures to block unwanted cable channels was 
sufficient). 
142 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
U.S. 37, 49 (1983). 
143 United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 
(2000). 
144 See id. at 816. 
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Determining whether protecting minors constitutionally 
supports maintaining a total ban on cell phone Internet usage is 
difficult.  The Court tends to closely examine regulations that 
foreclose an entire medium.145  Airplanes offering Internet access 
could install filtering software similar to that in many public 
libraries instead of a total ban.  This solution seems more 
reasonably related to the government interest of protecting 
minors from access to harmful material than a total ban.146 
                                                
145 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 55 (1994) (“Although 
prohibitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of 
content or viewpoint discrimination, the danger they pose to the 
freedom of speech is readily apparent – by eliminating a common 
means of speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech.”). 
146 Cf. United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) 
(holding that the installation of Internet filters removable upon 
the request of patrons did not violate the First Amendment).  
However, even considering that the cost of such filters would be 
minimal - beyond the cost of the other technological requirements 
like a special transmitter on the airplane, such as a pico cell - 
the fact that many airlines are filing or have filed for 
bankruptcy indicates that they may not voluntarily incur these 
extra costs.  See Despina Afentouli, New Heights for In-Flight 
Internet, CNN.com, Mar. 31, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/TRAVEL/03/31/bt.internet.flight/ (“Many 
U.S. airlines are still in a difficult position financially and 
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V. The Government Cannot Constitutionally Maintain a Complete Ban 
on Cell Phone Use In-Flight 
 
The focus of this analysis has been to determine if the 
First Amendment allows the FCC or FAA to maintain the current ban 
on in-flight cell phone use if there is no reasonable possibility 
of interference with ground communication or on-board navigation 
systems.  Total bans absent strong government interests are often 
considered unconstitutional. 147  Plus, lifting the ban would have 
                                                                                                                                            
Delta Airlines is only now considering in-flight Internet - which 
would make it the first domestic U.S. airline to do so.”) It is 
also important to note that such filtering software would not 
block any stored images on a passenger’s cell phone. 
147 See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (stating that 
the State may not “reduce the adult population . . . to reading 
only what is fit for children”); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech 
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 252 (2002); United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) (“The objective of 
shielding children does not suffice to support a blanket ban if 
the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive 
alternative”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (“The 
government interest in protecting children from harmful materials 
. . . does not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of 
speech addressed to adults”). 
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positive effects – increased business productivity and greater 
freedom of expression during flight.  However, many people 
support maintaining the ban.  Some are concerned that cell phone 
use during flight would impinge on the privacy of other 
passengers, force unwilling listeners to endure offensive speech, 
or subject minors to indecent material.  However, the Court is 
often hesitant to infringe on constitutionally protected speech 
for incidental benefits.148 
Prior jurisprudence addressed such concerns through 
application of the captive audience doctrine.  This doctrine 
                                                
148 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21-22 (1971) (stating 
that the presence of an unwilling listener does not justify 
proscribing otherwise constitutionally protected speech if the 
speech is easily avoidable by the unwilling listener); see also 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975) 
(holding unconstitutional a regulation banning all films 
containing any nudity on a drive-in theater screen.  One failing 
justification by the city was the protection of minors outside 
the drive-in who could see the films.  “Speech that is neither 
obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate 
proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young 
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable 
for them. In most circumstances, the values protected by 
the First Amendment are no less applicable when government seeks 
to control the flow of information to minors.”). 
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balanced the interests of the unwilling listener with the 
interests of the speaker.  While the confined nature of an 
airplane might seem like a prototypical location for a captive 
audience, airplane passengers are not captives.  Both the audio 
and visual parts of cell phone Internet use during flight are 
easily avoided, which weighs heavily against favoring the 
unwilling listener by banning the use of cell phones.  Most cell 
phone screens are small and any unwilling viewer can easily avert 
their eyes.  It requires little effort for a passenger to avoid a 
screen that only measures 2.5 inches wide by 2.71 inches high.149  
Also, a regulation that screen filters be installed to limit the 
angles at which the screen is visible would quell many concerns 
about exposure to unwilling viewers or minors.150 
                                                
149 Cingular Wireless sells a BlackBerry 7100g, one of the mobile 
devices with the largest screen – 240 x 260 pixels (2.5 x 2.71 
inches.  Cingular Wireless, Online Store, 
http://onlinestorez.cingular.com/cell-phone-service/cell-
phones/cell-phones.jsp?source=INC230063&_requestid=94064 (enter 
zip code when prompt; then scroll down to BlackBerry 7100g) (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2005). 
150 Privacy filters are commonly available for laptops.  Secure-
It, 3M Privacy Filters, Keep Private Information Private with 3M 
Filters, http://www.secure-it.com/products/privacy.htm (follow 
“3M Privacy Filter / Privacy Screen” hyperlink) (last visited 
Jan. 10, 2006).  Privacy filters restrict the visible area to 
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While there is little differentiation between audio cell 
phone speech and passenger conversations, the Court may uphold a 
regulation short of a total ban of in-flight cell phone use – 
such as a volume or headphone regulation – as a reasonable 
regulation.  Being that an airplane is not a traditional public 
forum, the government regulations only have to be reasonable.  
However, a total ban of cell phones when other, less drastic, 
regulations are available seems less and less reasonable. 
                                                                                                                                            
those directly in front of the screen and present nothing but a 
black screen to those viewing from an angle.  Id. 
